Documents, Reports and Transcripts are at:
http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing013003.htm
First, the opening statements of the Honorable Charles Grassley, the
esteemed Senator from Iowa.
Opening Statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley, of Iowa
Committee on Finance Oversight Hearing
"The U.S. Border: Safe or Sieve?"
Thursday, January 30, 2003
Good morning and thank you all for coming.
I called this hearing to examine the security of our nation's
borders. We should all know how important this is. Even before the attacks
of September 11, terrorists had exploited loopholes in our immigration
system and lax security at ports of entry. If we're serious about
protecting this country from new attacks, then we have to get serious about
border security. So we're here to do some oversight and find out if our
borders are safe, or like a sieve.
As the chairman and ranking member of the Finance Committee, both I
and Senator Baucus are worried about the illegal transport of currency --
especially counterfeit money or terrorism funds through our borders. As
you all know, this currency can cause enormous damage by undermining our
markets, or supporting the drug trade and terrorists. So I am looking
forward to a candid hearing about the security of our borders.
I have a particular concern about INS enforcement. If we don't
secure the border, the consequences affect the whole country. More and
more, my state of Iowa is becoming a byway for smugglers and illegal
immigrants. The INS enforcement problems have real consequences not just
for national security but for immigrants who often are duped by smugglers.
For example, last year, 11 immigrants were trapped for weeks in a railroad
box car near Denison and died. And just a few weeks ago, nine people died
when a van full of immigrants crashed in Menlo. We need better enforcement
to prevent these tragedies. I think an INS office in the Quad Cities, which
I've been asking for, might help with that.
We may hear some criticism today, but that's not the point. We're
here to improve our security. I think Congressional oversight is one of the
best ways to do that. It's a crucial part of our Constitutional system of
checks and balances. We have to find out what's not working so we can
make it better.
The timing of this hearing is important. The new Department of
Homeland Security is becoming operational and faces big challenges. I think
border security is going to be one of the
[Page 1 of 3]
biggest problems. So we're going to find out what's going on with the
agencies responsible for the border the INS, Customs Service and the
Interior Department.
The Department of Homeland Security can take lessons from this, and
I hope they are implemented. And I hope this sends a message to any
bureaucrat at the Interior Department who stands in the way of law
enforcement reform and border security that message is: Forget about your
turf and power, and think about people's lives.
I want to thank all of you for being here. I especially want to
thank GAO and the Interior Department Inspector General Devaney for the
excellent oversight work they've done, and Agent Dan Wirth, with FLEOA for
giving us the ground-level view of the border situation.
And I thank INS, Customs and the Interior Department for sending
their representatives.
The first part of our hearing will focus on ports of entry, the
responsibility of the INS and Customs. Senator Baucus and I asked the GAO's
Office of Special Investigations, the OSI, to test our borders to find out
how easy it is for people using bogus IDs to carry undeclared money and
credit cards across the borders. The investigation took place on the
Northern border, the Southwest border, and at a major international airport
by way of the Carribean. The border was tested by sea, by air, by car, and
on foot. In every instance, our border was penetrated -- sometimes the
investigators didn't even need their fake IDs. And in every instance,
undercover agents carried undeclared cash or credit cards across the border.
These results should trouble all of us. Today, we will hear from
the GAO team that carried out the investigation. I know that we will all
find their testimony most captivating, and most disturbing.
Shortly after this investigation concluded, the INS and the Customs
Service were briefed on the exact details of the investigation. After the
GAO agents speak, we will hear from INS and Customs officials about how this
happened and what steps are being taken to improve border security.
The second focus is the Interior Department's border
responsibilities. The Interior Department is in charge of 37 percent of the
Southwest Border with national parks and other public land. In the Spring
of last year, I launched an investigation into law enforcement problems at
Interior. My investigation was triggered by an IG report, issued at the
request of Secretary Norton, calling for massive reform of the Interior law
enforcement force.
My oversight investigators found that the hardening of ports of
entry by INS and the Customs Service has pushed drug smugglers and illegal
aliens into desolate and rugged Interior Department land. So the result of
the squeeze at the port of entry is a bulge at the more remote borders
controlled by Interior.
This bulge puts Americans and Interior law enforcement personnel at
risk. Last summer,
[Page 2 of 3]
Ranger Chris Eggle was killed by a fugitive drug smuggler from Mexico while
he was patrolling Arizona's Oregon Pipe Cactus Monument Park. I know an
investigative report is forthcoming, but I'm concerned about whether rangers
like Ranger Eggle are getting proper training and support to defend our
borders, or even themselves. I know that Ranger Eggle's murder, and the
border problem in Arizona, is a concern for Sen. Kyl, who is a member of
this committee.
Earl Devaney, the Inspector General, is here to testify. I expect
that he will describe the nature of the problems in the four thousand plus
law enforcement force, the third largest in the federal government. He will
also be able to describe problems at the border, and how reforms would help
solve those problems. I hope Inspector General Devaney can also tell us
about a new whistleblower protection program in his office, because
whistleblowers are so important for oversight.
We also have with us Dan Wirth, who is speaking as the
representative for Park Service federal agents to the Federal Law
Enforcement Officers Association. Agent Wirth is the border coordinator for
the Interior Department in Tucson, Arizona. He can give us a view from the
front lines, and help us understand just what's going wrong at the Southwest
border.
I understand that Agent Wirth will be showing us some alarming
night-vision footage of unidentified illegal aliens crossing the Southwest
border through family campgrounds. I look forward to seeing that footage
and know you all will too.
Finally, we will hear from Don Murphy, Deputy Director of the Park
Service. Mr. Murphy can bring us up to date on the state of reform at
Interior, and, along with Mr. Devaney and Agent Wirth, can help us discuss
solutions to the border problem at Interior.
So I look forward to a very constructive hearing, and I again thank
all the witnesses for your time and effort. I believe Senator Baucus may
have some remarks. Senator Baucus...
[Page 3 of 3]
(Senator Baucus remarks are not available at the time of this posting.)
Next, the Report of Robert Cramer, Managing Director, Office of Special
Investigations, GeneralAccounting Office, Washington, DC
Accompanied by: Ronald Malfi, Director, Office of Special Investigations,
General Accounting Office, Washington, DC and John W. Cooney, Assistant
Director, Office of Special Investigations, General Accounting Office,
Washington, DC
WEAKNESSES IN SCREENING ENTRANTS INTO THE UNITED STATES
Statement of Robert J. Cramer, Managing Director Office of Special
Investigations United States General Accounting Office GAO Testimony Before
the Committee on Finance United States Senate For Release on Delivery
Expected at 10:00 a.m. Thursday, January 30, 2003 GAO-03-438T
[GAO-03-438T U.S. Border Crossings 1 ]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am here today to discuss the results of our work described in our January
30, 2003, Limited Official Use report to this Committee entitled Weaknesses
in Screening Entrants into the United States (GAO-03-425R).[1] This work
was completed in response to your request that agents of the Office of
Special Investigations (OSI) attempt to enter the United States from Canada,
Mexico and Jamaica at land, air, and sea ports of entry using fictitious
identities and counterfeit identification documents. The purpose was to test
whether U. S. government officials conducting inspections at the port of
entry would detect the counterfeit identification documents.
I am accompanied this morning by Ronald Malfi, Director for Investigations,
and Assistant Director John Cooney. In summary, we created fictitious
drivers licenses and birth certificates using off-the-shelf computer graphic
software that is available to any purchaser. In addition, we obtained and
carried credit cards in the fictitious names that were used in these tests.
Our agents entered the United States from Canada, Mexico, and Jamaica
through ports of entry using fictitious names and these counterfeit
identification documents. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and
U.S. Customs Service officials never questioned the authenticity of the
counterfeit documents, and our agents encountered no difficulty entering the
country using them. On two occasions, INS officials did not ask for or
inspect any identification documents when our agents entered the United
States. On another occasion an agent was able to walk across a major border
checkpoint and was not stopped or inspected by any government official.
INS regulations require that all persons who arrive at a U.S. port of entry
be inspected by a government official. A U.S. citizen traveling inside
countries in the Western Hemisphere, such as those we visited for purposes
of these tests, is not required to show a passport when entering the United
States but is required to prove citizenship. INS accepts as proof of
citizenship documents such as a U.S. state or federally issued birth
[Ref 1 The Immigration and Naturalization Service designated our report as
Limited Official Use. GAO-03-438T U.S. Border Crossings 2]
certificate or a baptismal record, and photo identification such as a
drivers license. However, since the law does not require that U.S. citizens
present documents to prove citizenship when entering the United States, INS
also permits travelers to establish U.S. citizenship by oral statements alone.
U.S. Border Crossings from Canada
The first border crossing by OSI agents occurred when two of our agents
entered the United States through a sea port of entry from Canada. On that
occasion, the agents were not asked to show any identification. On a
subsequent occasion, two agents, driving a rented car with Canadian plates,
using fictitious names and counterfeit documents, crossed the border into
the United States at a Canadian land border crossing. A U.S. Customs
inspector asked for identification and was provided the counterfeit
documents. After the inspector reviewed the documents, the agents were
allowed to cross the border.
During the Canadian land border crossing, the agents discovered a further
potential security problem. A park straddles the U.S. and Canada at this
border crossing. One of our agents was able to walk across this park into
the United States from Canada without being stopped or questioned by any
U.S. government official. Later that agent walked back to Canada through
this park without being inspected by Canadian authorities.
U.S. Border Crossing from Mexico
The second series of border crossings were from Mexico. On one occasion, at
a land border crossing, an INS inspector asked our agent if he was a U.S.
citizen and whether he had brought anything across the border from Mexico.
After the agent responded that he was a U.S. citizen and that he was not
bringing anything into the United States from Mexico, the inspector allowed
him to proceed without requiring any proof of identity.
[GAO-03-438T U.S. Border Crossings 3]
On a subsequent occasion at the same border crossing, two of our agents were
asked by INS inspectors for identification. Both agents presented
counterfeit driver s licenses and were allowed to cross into the United States.
U.S. Border Crossing from Jamaica
The third set of border crossings were from Jamaica. Two of our agents
traveling on one-way tickets from Jamaica arrived at an airport in the
United States. Each agent presented to INS inspectors counterfeit
identification documents. The INS inspectors did not recognize any of the
documents presented as counterfeit and allowed the agents to enter the
United States.
Conclusion
We recognize that weaknesses in inspection processes for entrants into the
United States raise complex issues. We are currently performing an
evaluation of those processes pursuant to the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 that will be reported to Congress in
the coming months. Although INS inspects millions of people who enter the
United States and detects thousands of individuals who attempt to illegally
enter the United States each year, the results of our work indicate that
(1) people who enter the United States are not always asked to present
identification,
(2) security to prevent unauthorized persons from entering the United States
from Canada is inadequate at the border park we visited, and
(3) INS inspectors are not readily capable of detecting counterfeit
identification documents. We plan to discuss further with INS options for
better training of inspectors in detecting counterfeit documents.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. We will be pleased to
respond to any questions you or other members of the Committee may have at
this time. (601102)
Next, statement of Johnny Williams, Executive Associate Comissioner for
Field Operations, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Washington, DC
U.S. Department of Justice
Immigration and Naturalization Service
STATEMENT
OF
JOHNNY N. WILLIAMS
EXECUTIVE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER
FOR FIELD OPERATIONS
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
BEFORE THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE
REGARDING
COMBATING TERRORISM:
PROTECTING THE UNITED STATES
10:00AM
215 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
JANUARY 30, 2003
[1]
Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before this committee today to discuss the Immigration
and Naturalization Service's (INS) commitment to combating terrorism.
The INS responded to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks with an
immediate and sustained dedication of effort by performing direct law
enforcement activities, providing identification and intercept capabilities,
increasing border security, supplying intelligence information, completing
investigative and detention functions with the goal of strengthening
national security, and working even more closely with our fellow law
enforcement agencies.
Allow me briefly to describe how, since September 11th, INS is strengthening
border security, enhancing our interior enforcement efforts, and working in
coordination with the new Department of Homeland Security.
Ports-of-Entry
INS along with other federal law enforcement agencies are responsible for
368 land, sea, and air Ports-of-Entry (POEs) covering more than 8,000 miles
of land and costal borders.
Our lead role in the admissibility and control of aliens is fundamental to
the security of the United States, so, one can understand the magnitude of
INS' responsibility. Since September 11th, Immigration Inspectors at our
POEs have focused on providing heightened security, at first with INS'
Threat Level One operating procedures and now with our color-coded Alert
Level operating guidance. Threat Level One commitments
[2]
included: staffing all small and remote land ports 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week; completing record checks of those seeking admission; completing
enhanced checks of vehicles as they cross the land borders; and working with
the U.S. Coast Guard and other agencies to safeguard our seaports.
Because of September 11, 2001, there was an increased focus on our Northern
Border POEs, this resulted in more than 250 Inspectors, an increase of
nearly 55%, being added along our Northern Border.
In order to support and sustain last year's Threat Level One operations in
terms of monitoring and securing our land POEs, we requested and received
support from the Department of Defense (DoD). This request was supported
through $34 million provided in the first Counter Terrorism Supplemental
Appropriation passed by Congress.
The DoD supplied National Guard personnel and equipment to land border POEs
to provide a heightened security presence, assisted INS officers in physical
inspection of vehicles, and helped perform traffic management and pedestrian
control duties. Between the POEs, the DoD supplied logistical and technical
support to sector intelligence centers, helicopters in six sectors, and
assistance in deploying sensing and surveillance equipment. INS has
effectively used this partnership to maintain Threat Level One anti-
terrorism operations to protect the integrity and security of our border.
[3]
Most recently, INS has implemented the National Security Entry Exit
Registration System (NSEERS). The NSEERS program requires certain
nonimmigrant aliens from designated countries to be fingerprinted,
interviewed and photographed by the INS at POEs at the same time they apply
for admission to the United States. In addition, other aliens who are
identified from intelligence sources or who match certain pre-existing
criteria determined by the Attorney General or Secretary of State may also
be enrolled in NSEERS.
NSEERS promotes several important national security objectives:
* It allows the United States to run the fingerprints of aliens seeking
to enter the U.S. or present in the U.S. against a database of known terrorists.
* It enables the INS to determine instantly whether such an alien has
overstayed his/her visa.
* It enables the INS to verify that an alien is living where he said he
would live, and doing what he said he would do while in the United States,
and to ensure that he is not violating our immigration laws.
During the enrollment process, specific biographic information, itineraries
and addresses are collected. If aliens registered at POEs remain in the
United States longer than 30 days, they must return to an INS office for an
interview to confirm their address and activities in the United States.
Registrants must also complete a departure check when they leave the country.
[4]
In addition to the POE enrollment process, there is another class of aliens
subject to special registration, known as "Domestic Registrants." Domestic
Registrants are certain nonimmigrant aliens who were admitted to the United
States prior to the inception of the new registration program, have since
remained and who, when designated by the Attorney General, must report to an
INS office to be registered. The purpose is to gather the same information
that may have been collected at the POEs had those aliens arrived after the
effective date for NSEERS. These requirements do not apply to United
States citizens, lawful permanent residents, refugees, asylees, certain
asylum applicants or aliens who entered without inspection. The goal of
NSEERS is to secure our borders, by intercepting terrorists and criminals at
the POEs, by identifying aliens who deviate from their stated purposes once
they enter the country, and by identifying instantly aliens who overstay
their visas. The process has operated effectively with participation of
more than 74,000 temporary foreign visitors from more than 151 countries.
INS officers have made every effort to minimize any delay or inconvenience
to those individuals required to register under this program. Currently,
our average processing time for registration at the port of entry is only 18
minutes.
As of January 23, 2003, NSEERS has led to the identification and
apprehension of 7 suspected terrorists. In addition, under the NSEERS
program, we have apprehended or denied admission to more than 341 aliens at
our ports of entry who present law enforcement threats due to felony
warrants or prior criminal or immigration violations rendering them
inadmissible. These individuals would have entered the country had NSEERS
not been in place.
Thus far, 26,334 individuals have been registered through the domestic
enrollment program and 2,776 of those individuals have been charged with
status violations. 84 of these individuals remain in custody and 21 have
serious criminal histories. Among these individuals are an alien from a
state sponsor of terrorism who was here illegally and had been convicted
three times of assault with a
[5]
deadly weapon and an alien from a state sponsor of terrorism who was here
illegally and had been convicted twice of child molestation. In addition,
as a result of evading the 30 day reporting requirement, we investigated and
apprehended a Saudi Arabian flight student in Florida, who has now been
placed in removal proceedings.
Effective border enforcement starts overseas. Through an initiative with
the Department of State, we have deployed more than 100 immigration
officers, most of them Inspectors, to consulates and airports abroad to aid
local authorities in identifying and intercepting individuals attempting to
enter the United States by means of fraud.
As part of our ongoing efforts to enhance public safety and national
security, the INS announced this month that it will require all commercial
carriers to submit detailed passenger manifests to the INS electronically
before an aircraft or vessel arrives in or departs from the United States.
Section 402 of the Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002
requires the submission of Advanced Passenger Information (API) on all
passengers arriving by sea or air. Passenger information that must be
submitted in advance includes: complete name; date of birth; citizenship;
gender; passport number and country of issuance; country of residence; U.S.
visa number, date and place of issuance (where applicable); alien
registration number (where applicable); address while in the United States;
and such other information the Attorney General, in consultation with the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Treasury, determines to be necessary
for the enforcement of the immigration laws and to protect safety and
national security. The advance submission requirement will help the INS
verify the identities of individuals being transported and enforce U.S.
immigration laws. This program will assist inspectors
[6]
in our Passenger Analytical Units (PAUs) in reviewing passenger manifests
prior to an aircraft or vessel's arrival. These units generate useful
information for Inspectors engaged in determining whether an alien seeking
admission to the United States is in fact admissible. Using the Advanced
Passenger Information System (APIS) in conjunction with the Interagency
Border Inspection System (IBIS), INS PAU Inspectors are able to analyze
precisely the passenger arrival and departure information.
Combined with other passenger information systems or information obtained
through on-line airline reservation systems, Inspectors can make
associations between suspected fraud and smuggling activity and, through
link analysis, identify individual enforcement targets before they arrive in
the United States for inspection. This critical work assists the INS in
identifying illegal aliens, criminals, and terrorists prior to their arrival
at a U.S. POE.
We have worked with the State Department to expand data sharing to ensure
that Immigration Inspectors have access to the issued visa information in
the Consolidated Consular Database. Because of this cooperative effort, an
alien's photograph from the time of visa issuance and visa information is
now available in INS Secondary Inspection to help determine if an alien is
engaging in fraudulent conduct. We will continue to work with the
Department of State to expand our exchange of information.
In the aftermath of September 11th, INS worked with other agencies and the
Office of Homeland Security to develop 7 interagency security enhancements
initiatives for the
[7]
refugee program. These heightened security enhancements included additional
databases, records and fingerprint checks, and pre-flight notification to
the FBI. By implementing these measures, we balanced protecting ourselves
against people who seek to harm the United States with our commitment to
provide resettlement to those in need of protection.
The INS, other Department of Justice components, and the State Department
developed new criteria for scrutinizing visa applicants, which are now in
place. Together, we are reassessing the eligibility of certain countries to
participate in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). For example, the Attorney
General terminated Argentina's participation in the VWP in February 2002,
and we have joined with the State Department to tighten regulations
regarding various entry procedures that under ordinary circumstances
facilitate travel, but which could be exploited to do harm to the United
States. Current law, states that U.S. citizens do not need passports to
travel in the Western Hemisphere, except to Cuba.
Immigration Enforcement with the United States
INS has always emphasized, and will continue to emphasize national security
by protecting our country's borders and through enforcement of our
immigration laws. In late 1997, INS designated a Counter Terrorism
Coordinator for the INS' involvement with other agencies in the federal
effort against international terrorism. In 1999, the National Security Unit
(NSU) was formally created within the Office of Field
[8]
Operations.
In 2000, the Office of the General Counsel created the National Security Law
Division to work hand in hand with the NSU. This Division is charged with
the coordination of legal advice for all national security cases, programs
and law enforcement actions performed by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. These two offices work together to ensure that alien terrorists,
human rights abusers and other non-citizens that pose a threat to the
security of the United States are placed in removal proceedings and removed
from the country. The NSU Office of Field Operations was designated on
September 14, 2001 within the Office of Field Operations to coordinate the
investigation and possible detention of individuals related to the attacks
of September 11th. The attacks on September 11th refocused the INS'
strategic approach to its interior enforcement responsibilities. The INS is
committed, as the highest priority of its interior enforcement strategy, to
ensure domestic security using all the immigration law enforcement tools at
its disposal. There are several notable examples of this approach.
As a result of a new emphasis on worksite enforcement targeting national
interest industries and infrastructure, there has been a significant
increase in employer-related case completions. Specifically, soon after
September 11th, the INS launched Operation Tarmac, an operation designed to
enhance security at our nation's airports. Operation Tarmac has been
undertaken in cooperation with a variety of Federal agencies, as well as
airport authority management officials. Operation Tarmac consists of
proactive worksite enforcement investigations into the hiring practices of
companies employing individuals who work at airports and who have direct
access to commercial aircraft and other secure areas. It is designed to
ensure that these individuals are authorized to work in the United
[9]
States and that employers are complying with the employment eligibility
verification requirements. Particular attention is devoted to companies
that provide security at major airports throughout the United States.
Operation Tarmac has proven to be an important enforcement operation. For
example, the INS has audited more than 224,000 Employment Eligibility
Verification Forms (Forms I-9) at more than 3,000 airport businesses; and,
to date, over 900 unauthorized aliens have been arrested, and over 680 have
been charged with criminal violations of law. Operation Tarmac has
resulted in the prosecution of individuals who have violated criminal
immigration statutes and in the removal of unauthorized aliens from airport
worksites. Operation Tarmac also provides fraudulent document training to
security officials responsible for granting access badges to secure areas.
INS also initiated Operation Glowworm, using the same goals and
methodologies to enhance the security of our nation's nuclear power
facilities. INS field officers have already investigated 89 nuclear plants
and facilities and 65,000 permanent and contract employees with direct plant
and facility access.
With international interest on Super Bowl XXXVII at San Diego, California,
the INS launched Operation Game Day in support of public security and
safety. Operation Game Day targeted the Security Guard and transportation
(Taxi, Limousine and Shuttle Drivers) industries in the San Diego area that
had close or unrestricted access to Super Bowl activities including Qualcomm
Stadium. The INS reviewed employment
[10]
authorization records of approximately 11,000 security guards and checked
indices for approximately 3,500 licensed taxi drivers working in the San
Diego area. Operation Game Day resulted in the arrest of 45 security guards
and 24 taxi or limousine drivers from countries all over the world for
either criminal or immigration violations of law.
The INS Anti-Smuggling Program is focused on dismantling smuggling
organizations with links to terrorism and other smuggling organizations that
pose a risk to the national security of the United States. Information
available to the INS indicates terrorist organizations often use human
smuggling organizations to move around the globe.
Investigations of these organizations play a vital role in the INS' overall
homeland security efforts.
Our efforts to focus our anti-smuggling resources on domestic security led
to the initiation of Operation Southern Focus. In January 2002, the INS
initiated a multi-jurisdictional enforcement initiative targeting
significant alien smuggling organizations specializing in the movement of
U.S.-bound aliens from countries that are of interest to the national
security of the United States. The INS believes that alien smuggling
organizations may wittingly or unwittingly be utilized to clandestinely
smuggle terrorists around the globe. Many targets of Operation Southern
Focus were believed to be responsible for smuggling hundreds of aliens.
Since the inception of this operation, eight significant alien smugglers
have been arrested and charged with alien smuggling violations, and
significant alien smuggling pipelines have been severely crippled.
[11]
INS participation in the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) continues to be
one of the key elements in the INS' efforts to combat international
terrorism in the interior of the United States. The INS has 153 agents
stationed at 55 JTTF locations. JTTF agents serve as a critical component
in the effort to root out terrorists and their supporters. INS Special
Agents working with the JTTFs have played a significant role in recent
terrorist investigations nationwide. Working closely with the FBI and other
agencies within the multi-agency task forces, INS Special Agents serve the
United States' security efforts by proactively investigating, targeting, and
arresting known terrorists, terrorist organization leaders, members, and
associates. The INS' Special Agents assigned to the JTTFs have conducted
approximately 6,800 joint INS/FBI interviews since September 11, 2001 and
play a critical role in our domestic security efforts.
On January 28, 2002, the INS initiated the Absconder Apprehension Initiative
(AAI).
The AAI is an aggressive strategy to locate and apprehend aliens with
unexecuted administrative final orders of deportation or removal who have
failed to appear for scheduled immigration proceedings or have failed to
surrender for removal as ordered.
The first phase of this initiative is focused on apprehending, interviewing,
and removing approximately 5,900 aliens from countries where al Qaeda is
known to operate or recruit.
The second phase of this initiative is focused on the apprehension and
removal of more than 300,000 aliens with unexecuted final orders of removal.
In order to help locate these aliens, we are entering their names into the
National Crime Information Center
[12]
(NCIC) so that we add the weight of other Federal, state, and local law
enforcement officers to this mission.
Ensuring that foreign students comply with the terms of their visas is also
critical to our nation's security. To accomplish this, we have developed
and deployed the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS).
It is an Internet-based system that integrates and incorporates information
directly from schools, exchange programs, INS systems, and Department of
State data. This system will greatly improve our ability to track foreign
students. In fact, schools are required to report the failure of a foreign
student to enroll within 30 days after the school's registration deadline.
Additionally, starting today, January 30, 2003, any new foreign student must
be entered and issued forms from SEVIS, and only INS or Department of State
approved schools or programs can access SEVIS. SEVIS will enable us to
track foreign students in the United States with far greater speed and
accuracy by maintaining critical, up to date information about foreign
students and exchange visitors, and ensure that they are properly
maintaining their status during their stay in this country.
The Border Patrol
Following the events of September 11th, the Border Patrol undertook a number
of enforcement initiatives to assist in supporting and augmenting U.S.
national security.
Upon the initiative of the INS, 317 Border Patrol Agents were detailed to 9
airports across the country within 36 hours of the attack. As all of you
know, September 11,
[13]
2001, also resulted in a renewed focus on our Northern Border and its
security. The Border Patrol responded by detailing additional agents and
air assets to the 8 Northern border sectors to augment existing capabilities
and expand coverage within the sectors' areas of responsibilities. The
Border Patrol worked in cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard conducting
joint operations on the Great Lakes and surrounding waterways to deter
illegal entry and apprehend violators.
On the Northern Border, the Border Patrol is working with the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP), Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Canada Customs
and Revenue Agency and U.S. Customs to establish Integrated Border
Enforcement Teams (IBETs) at several key locations. IBET teams serve as a
"force multiplier" by combining team personnel, resources and technology
from many agencies, both Canadian and American, to enhance border integrity
and security at our shared border. IBETs operate as intelligence-driven
teams to address terrorism and identify and arrest persons who pose a threat
to national security or who engage in other criminal activity. For the
first time in INS history, a permanent Border Patrol Agent position has been
authorized to be assigned to RCMP headquarters in Ottawa, Ontario in Canada.
Understanding the critical need for permanent staffing and equipment
increases to strengthen security on our Northern Border, with your support,
we increased the number of remote video surveillance cameras, fixed-wing
airplanes, and helicopters to our list of "force multipliers" along the
Northern Border. We have also added 245 experienced Border Patrol Agents to
the Northern Border, an increase of over 70% since September 11, 2001,
[14]
in addition to the more than 250 Inspectors added to Northern Border POEs
that I mentioned earlier.
The INS is actively engaged in direct cooperative actions with both Canada
and Mexico to secure our collective borders. Last December 2001, INS
actively engaged in an Office of Homeland Security-led international
conference in Ottawa, Canada, that included representatives from the
Departments of Justice, Transportation, Defense, State, and of the Treasury.
An important product of that conference was a Smart Border Declaration
signed by then Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge and Canadian Deputy
Prime Minister John Manley. The Declaration includes 30 initiatives aimed
at enhancing security along our shared border. The INS was a major
contributor to this agreement.
Turning to our southern border, in the context of 20 meetings held in
Washington, Mexico City and Monterrey, since September 11, U.S. and Mexican
representatives have developed a comprehensive and unprecedented dialogue on
border safety, regularization and other border security issues.
On March 22, 2002 then Governor Ridge, the then INS Commissioner Ziglar, and
other senior Administration officials traveled to Mexico City, Mexico to
develop broad-based proposals for strengthening our joint security and to
build on recent cooperative efforts with the Mexican government. At that
meeting, we signed the U.S. Mexico Border Partnership. The 22-point U.S.
Mexico Border Partnership Action Plan focuses on three areas:
infrastructure development, the secure flow of people, and the secure flow
of goods. INS is working with the Department of State and other agencies to
provide
[15]
appropriate law enforcement training, technical and material foreign
assistance to Mexican authorities in implementation of the Action Plan.
This agreement affirms our commitment and cooperation to safe and orderly
borders by endorsing a series of specific actions intended to serve our
common security in the years to come. By working together, the United
States, Canada and Mexico will ensure more secure borders. We will continue
to deploy agents, technology and support resources to meet our long-term
border management objectives to maintain and extend control along the
Southwest Border and increase control along the Northern Border.
Conclusion
The INS' mission of deterring illegal migration and combating
immigration-related crime has never been more critical to our nation's
efforts to ensure the safety of the American public. As you know, the INS
will transition to the new Department of Homeland Security on March 1, 2003.
Once there, the INS will be divided between its service and enforcement
components, and the organization we all know as the INS will cease to exist.
The new agencies that carry out our nation's immigration mission will be
different. The men and women of the INS are preparing for this significant
change. One thing is certain, what will not change is the determination and
dedication of the men and women of the INS to secure our borders and make
our nation safe.
16
Now, the statement of Robert Jacksta, Executive Director, Border Security
and Facilitation Customs Service, Washington, DC
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT JACKSTA
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF BORDER SECURITY AND FACILITATION
OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS
BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE
HEARING ON "BORDER SECURITY: SAFE OR SIEVE?"
JANUARY 30, 2003
Senator Grassley, Members of the Committee, thank you for this
opportunity to testify. I am Robert Jacksta, Executive Director of Border
Security and Facilitation, Office of Field Operations. I would like to
discuss today, the efforts of the U.S. Customs Service to secure our borders
against terrorism and other criminal threats while efficiently processing
people, cargo, and conveyances at our ports of entry.
Prior to full integration into the Department of Homeland Security,
Customs has historically shared the responsibility of protecting our borders
with multiple agencies, our closest partner in this endeavor being the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). All people and goods entering
the United States must legally enter through one of over 300 land, air, or
sea ports, which are controlled points of entry into the U.S. from foreign
countries. In fiscal year 2002, more than 400 million people passed through
these ports into the United States. I would like to add that we also have a
close working relationship with the Department of Agriculture's Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service. APHIS monitors both people and cargo to
prevent the entry of foreign pests and diseases that could harm both
agriculture and people.
[1]
Customs, INS, and other agencies jointly manage the borders of the
United States. INS controls the entry of persons, and Customs controls the
entry of merchandise (cargo).
Customs and INS have been working very closely on a number of
initiatives in support of the efficient and effective screening of travelers
and conveyances entering and leaving the United States. Examples of these
initiatives include the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS),
Dedicated Commuter Lane (DCL), and License Plate Reader (LPR) programs. I
would also like to recognize the Transportation Security Administration's
efforts in these areas.
Customs is also a member of the Data Management Improvement Act
(DMIA) Task Force that was established in part to assess how the U.S. can
improve the flow of travelers at airports, seaports, and land border ports
of entry.
Customs is committed to programs aimed at efficiently and reliably
identifying compliant travelers while ensuring that all travelers are
screened appropriately. I would like to outline current programs which
utilize a combination of advance information, pre-screening and enrollment
of compliant, frequent travelers, and biometric technology to aid in cross
border processing.
NEXUS and SENTRI
Customs and INS have developed the Dedicated Commuter Lane (DCL)
program to allow compliant, pre-screened travelers to be processed
expeditiously by both agencies. Applicants are interviewed, queried against
enforcement
[2]
databases and watch lists, and a biometric (fingerprint) is captured,
checked against the INS IDENT database, and maintained as part of the
applicant's file.
These programs are called NEXUS on the U.S. Canada Border and Secure
Electronic Network for Travelers (SENTRI) on the U.S. - Mexico Border.
Separating compliant travelers under the NEXUS and SENTRI programs allows
Customs and INS to concentrate efforts on non-compliant travelers.
Free and Secure Trade (FAST)
Another program is "Free and Secure Trade," which is often referred
to as the FAST program, an automated cargo release system designed to
expedite the processing of highly compliant importers and drivers. Drivers
participating in the FAST program are required to undergo a background
review by Canadian Customs and Immigration and U. S. Customs and
Immigration. If approved, the driver will be required to carry a FAST
identification card that indicates the driver's registered status. The card
has unique identifiers to allow for expeditious identification and
processing of the driver.
[3]
Advance Passenger Information System (APIS)
In cooperation with the INS and the Airline Industry, Customs
developed the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) in 1988 to provide
carriers with an electronic means of collecting and transmitting passenger
and crew biographical data to Customs and INS. APIS is an enforcement
selectivity tool that automatically queries passenger information against
enforcement databases. APIS allows Customs and INS to facilitate
law-abiding passengers and identify those passengers who may be attempting
to introduce contraband into the United States. APIS is currently capable
of capturing 100% of air/sea passenger/crew data both inbound and outbound.
Air NEXUS
Customs has also been working closely with Canadian Customs and
Immigration on the NEXUS - AIR project. This project takes positive steps
in addressing the need for expedited processing of travelers deemed to be
compliant based on various risk assessment tools. The project will
encompass some form of technology (biometric) to validate identity.
Program eligibility is assessed through queries against enforcement
databases, interviews, and background checks that review employment and
address histories.
Northern Border Ports
With Congressional support, Customs has been able to strengthen
northern border ports with the addition of several hundred new inspectors,
agents
[4]
and the installation of technology and infrastructure improvements. In
addition, we are continuing to up-grade ports of entry on the southern border.
Equipment/Technology
Finally, Customs and INS are utilizing various technologies at its
ports of entry. One of the most widely used technologies is the document
reader, which reads information from a magnetic strip on certain documents
(Passports, Visas, and Border Crossing Cards), and then downloads the
information into a system that creates an automatic enforcement database
query and a record of the traveler.
Thank you again, Chairman Grassley and members of the Committee, for
giving the Customs Service this opportunity to testify. I would be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
[5]
Now, the statement of Earl Devaney, Inspector General, Department of the
Interior, Washington, DC
Before the Senate Committee on Finance
United States Senate
For Release on Delivery Expected
At 10AM EDT
Thursday
January 30, 2003
U.S. Borders: Safe or Sieve
Statement of
The Honorable Earl E. Devaney
Inspector General
U.S. Department of the Interior
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee
We appreciate the opportunity to testify today on law enforcement
concerns at the Department of the Interior with a particular emphasis on the
U.S. Borders. I would especially like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your
tireless efforts to champion accountability in Federal law enforcement and
for your attention to the concerns we raised in our January, 2002 report on
law enforcement at Interior entitled, "A Disquieting State of Disorder."
Our assessment of law enforcement was undertaken at the specific
request of Secretary Norton who, as the former Attorney General of Colorado,
is no stranger to the complexities of law enforcement. Initially we shared
a mutual concern that Interior's law enforcement units were all operating
independently of one another with no common policies, guidance or
operational practices. During the course of our assessment, 9-11 occurred,
which served to not only bring into sharper focus the inadequacies of law
enforcement in the Bureaus but also the critical need for a headquarters
Office of Law Enforcement to serve as a single point of contact for internal
and external coordination of Interior's law enforcement programs.
Ultimately, we made 25 separate recommendations that, with few
exceptions, were endorsed by the Secretary and incorporated into a decision
memo for Bureau Heads to implement. I am happy to report that Interior now
has an Office of Law Enforcement and Security and that it is headed by a
very capable Deputy Assistant Secretary who has an extensive Federal law
enforcement background. However, I regret to inform you that progress in
implementing many of our other recommendations is moving at "glacial speed."
Simply stated, despite the critical role law enforcement plays in our
Nation's Homeland Security efforts, Interior's Bureaus are not placing any
sense of urgency on law enforcement reforms. While I consider all of our
recommendations critical to the ultimate success of Interior's law
enforcement program, there are several recommendations that are particularly
germane to the subject of today's hearings. These are the issues of law
enforcement supervision, staffing, and the most important of all of our
recommendations, officer safety.
Although our report was very critical of Interior's law
enforcement hierarchy, we fully acknowledged that the overwhelming majority
of law enforcement professionals at Interior are capable and loyal officers
who recognize that their programs are in need of considerable change. Given
the predominance of the National Park Service law enforcement program on the
borders and the fact that the Service's law enforcement workforce comprises
50% of all Department of the Interior law enforcement personnel, I will
limit my comments on these recommendations as they specifically relate to
the Park Service.
Unlike any other Federal law enforcement component, the National
Park Service holds fiercely to the notion that non-law enforcement managers
can adequately supervise law enforcement agents and rangers who have powers
of arrest and are authorized to use deadly force. Our recommendation to
bring these officers under the direct supervision of professional law
enforcement managers was rejected out of hand by Park Service management as
an attempt to "stovepipe" and as a return to the command and control era.
We also do not consider a Superintendent who has taken a two week course in
law enforcement at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Georgia to
be a professional law enforcement manager. It is as if these enlightened
bureaucrats missed all of the hearings this Congress held in the recent past
on the inadequacies of law enforcement accountability by managers who
actually were all law enforcement professionals.
We first met with the Superintendent of the Organ Pipe Cactus
National Monument in July 2001, a year before the murder of Ranger Kris
Eggle. At that time, the Superintendent told us that he had eight (8)
rangers six permanent and two seasonal. He fully acknowledged the recent
explosion of drug smuggling and flow of illegal aliens at his Park. One year
later, when Ranger Eggle was killed, the Park had a protection staff of
five. Inexplicably, today, even after last August's tragedy, there are only
three (3) permanent law enforcement rangers at the Park, periodically
supplemented by seasonal rangers.
Even more disturbing is the statement the Superintendent made to
our assessment team that he often assigned non-law enforcement duties to his
small cadre of rangers so they would not become "too much like cops." Just
last week, the LA Times quoted this same Superintendent as saying that the
public does not want park rangers with the same hard edge as FBI agents but
instead "what the public wants is the park ranger to be cut from the same
cloth as a boy scout." Unfortunately, he is not alone in his thinking.
While on the border, we also heard about and later verified that another
border Superintendent deliberately left law enforcement ranger positions
vacant because he did not want to "unbalance" his workforce. That is, he
did not want too many law enforcement rangers in proportion to other
professionals at his Park. Even more egregious are the occasional reports we
hear about Superintendents who order their rangers not to carry their
weapons because it might somehow offend park visitors. Mr. Chairman and
Members of the Committee, we would submit to you that law enforcement is a
dangerous full-time job and those Superintendents and chief rangers who do
not understand this fundamental principle of modern policing should not be
approving, supervising or managing law enforcement officers.
We also recommended that each of Interior's law enforcement programs
develop staffing models when we learned that, unlike any other state, local
or Federal law enforcement program in America, Interior's Bureaus lacked any
discernable staffing methodologies. In fact, in their report on the
National Park Service's law enforcement program, the International
Association of Chiefs of Police described law enforcement staffing at the
Park Service as "patently illogical and erratic." Simply stated, we are
advocating putting the rangers where the crime is.
Today there are only thirteen (13) permanent law enforcement rangers
serving in the seven (7) National Parks along our borders. Clearly, given
the dire situation that exists on our borders, any creditable staffing model
would call for more than a mere 1% of the total number of law enforcement
rangers available to be assigned to these Parks. Perhaps the Park Service
management's philosophy about the crisis at the borders is best summed up by
relating a comment of a Park Service Associate Director. Shortly after
touring the Southeast border by helicopter he reportedly stated to his law
enforcement hosts, "It's not our problem."
In contrast, the brave men and women who serve at our Nation's
borders know full well that the countless dangers they encounter each and
every day makes it their problem, one which they are desperate to solve.
However, the dangers posed at the borders also exist for the visiting
public. Despite this fact, to our knowledge no warning signs have been
posted that would warn visitors about these dangers. Every time we ask why
not, Park Service officials tell us that they fear increased liability if
they were to post warning signs. One ranger at the border told our
assessment team that he does not even bother to write up crime reports
because "nobody ever asks for them." Culturally, we simply do not believe
that the Service can bring itself to publicly say any National Park is
dangerous.
Out of 25 recommendations, we only used the word "immediate" once to
describe the urgency of a needed reform. This was with regard to our
recommendation that staffing shortages which pose a clear safety risk to law
enforcement officers be identified immediately. Over a year has passed
since that recommendation was formally made and, to our knowledge, no
serious attempt has been made by the Park Service to complete this task.
Finally Mr. Chairman, I would like to touch on a subject in which I
know you have a long standing interest. I have mentioned several times
during my testimony today that we regularly receive feedback and source
information from working rangers in the field. These communications are
often made by rangers who have a genuine fear of retaliation if they are
caught talking to the IG. For instance, during our assessment, one group of
eight Park Service law enforcement professionals met us in a neutral city to
avoid detection from Park Service management. They reported the misuse of
monies appropriated for law enforcement being diverted by Park
Superintendents for non-law enforcement activities. They also chronicled
several instances of past retaliation against rangers who had "rocked the
boat" or dared to challenge the status quo. Since our report was issued we
have been gratified by the number of working rangers who have called or
e-mailed us with their support for our conclusions and the courage to
report additional waste and abuse by Park Service management. Many of these
matters warrant follow-up investigation.
To signal our commitment to the protection of these sources and our
absolute promise to investigate each and every claim of retaliation that
comes to our attention, I have appointed a senior investigator to the newly
created position of Associate Inspector General for Whistleblower
Protection. He will report directly to me and my Deputy and will have
broad authorities to carry out his duties.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I have served in Federal
government for a little over 32 years. I have never seen an organization
more unwilling to accept constructive criticism or embrace new ideas than
the National Park Service. Their culture is to fight fiercely to protect
the status quo and reject any idea that is not their own.
Their strategy to enforce the status quo is to take any new idea, such as a
law enforcement reform, and study it to death. Thus any IG recommendation
or, for that matter, Secretarial directive, falls victim to yet another Park
Service workgroup charged by their National Leadership Council to defend
the status quo from those of us who just do not understand the complexities
of being a ranger.
That concludes my prepared remarks. I would be glad to answer
any questions you may have.
Now, the statement of Daniel Wirth, National Park Service, Representative
to the Federal Law Enforcement officers Association (FLEOA), Tucson, AZ
FLEOA Oral Testimony before the Senate Finance Committee
January 30, 2003
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Finance Committee,
ladies and gentleman. Thank you for allowing the Federal Law
Enforcement Officers Association to testify today on the border
situation.
My name is Daniel Wirth. I am the president of the Tucson
Chapter of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association and
the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association Agency
President for the National Park Service. The Federal Law
Enforcement Officers Association is a voluntary, non-partisan,
professional association representing exclusively the interests of
over 19,000 members of federal law enforcement.
I am employed as a Special Agent for the National Park Service
and stationed at the Arizona High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
in Tucson, Arizona since 1996. I have also been detailed to the
Department of the Interior's Office of Law Enforcement and
Security as its Border Security Coordinator since 1997.
The Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association respectfully
asserts that the public lands on our borders are in a state of crisis.
The safety of the public, our officers and their families are at risk.
The resources that we are entrusted to protect are being destroyed
at alarming rates. This situation exists because our porous border
is conducive to smuggling by international criminal organizations.
This is a federal problem.
The Department of the Interior is the primary land management
agency in our government, responsible for 23 percent of the land in
the U.S. including 10 percent of the Canadian border and 40
percent of the Mexican border. The Department of the Interior has
four Bureaus with law enforcement authority. They include the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, National
Park Service, and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. These bureaus
employ approximately 4,000 federal officers with law enforcement
and homeland security responsibilities for national infrastructures,
borders, dams, gas and oil pipelines, electric transmission lines,
national icons and the protection of natural, cultural and historic
resources.
The Department of the Interior has experienced a significant
escalation in border impacts from smuggling over the last four
years. These impacts are decimating public resources and putting
the safety of our visitors and employees at serious risk. This is a
result of the success of increasing the allocation of Border Patrol
assets around the Ports of Entry which forced smuggling away
from the Ports of Entry and through our remote rural public lands.
This is well documented. Along the Mexican border over 80
percent of drug smuggling occurs between the Ports of Entry. The
northern border is now starting to experience similar trends.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs mission is unique in that it serves a
resident population of approximately 1.5 million tribal members.
The jurisdiction of Bureau of Indian Affairs includes lands in many
states and along the International borders of Mexico and Canada.
Mexican National drug organizations are developing extensive ties
within Indian Country and are moving large amounts of controlled
substances across the borders and throughout Indian Country.
Thousands of trails and hundreds of roads have been illegally
created by smugglers across our public lands. This proliferation of
trails and roads damages and destroys vegetation, wildlife, and
causes soil compaction and erosion.
Tons of trash and high concentrations of human waste are left
behind impacting wildlife, vegetation and water quality.
The international border fence is repeatedly cut or torn down in
most locations. Vehicles from Mexico can drive unimpeded across
most of our border.
Many Department of the Interior lands can no longer be used
safely by the public or employees due to pervasive smuggling.
Staff exposure while conducting resource management activities is
a serious safety concern. Federal land managers now must send
staff to the field in teams to ensure employee safety along the
border or totally restrict employee presence in certain border areas
due to the potential for unsafe encounters. Visitors have been
subjected to carjacking, assaults and robbery from armed
smugglers.
Within the 789 miles of Department of the Interior's jurisdiction on
the Mexican border there are only 30 officers. The Department of
the Interior has the highest assault rate on its officers of any
government agency. They work in remote areas with poor
communications and little if any backup and if you can believe
this, for managers that may have no background or understanding
of professional law enforcement.
This is a not an acceptable situation.
Our officers who are doing their jobs by defending our borders,
and our national security, have been intimidated, threatened,
assaulted, shot at and murdered by organized crime. These
sophisticated international organizations conduct surveillance and
counter-surveillance on our officers day and night; they utilize
encrypted radios, night-vision equipment, armed escorts, and
routinely resort to deadly violence. We are out manned and
outgunned in a war zone. We need help. We need your help.
The Department of the Interior has taken decisive steps to address
their responsibilities for border security. The Federal Law
Enforcement Officers Association thinks Secretary Norton is the
best thing that has happened to the Department of the Interior. As
a former attorney general, she possesses the professional ability to
analyze the Department's deficiencies and has taken a course of
action to correct them. But Secretary Norton needs congressional
support to carry out her reforms. Congress and the Office of
Management and Budget must recognize that the Department of
the Interior has a mandated responsibility for border security. Her
plan of action without the corresponding appropriations will not
result in productive outcomes.
Mr. Chairman and committee members, the question must be
asked. What can be done and what will be done to rectify this
crisis on our public lands and borders?
If I can take a moment, on behalf of the Federal Law Enforcement
Officers Association I want to sincerely thank Senator Grassley for
his continued support of the federal agents on the front line and for
his expressed concern for their welfare.
Thank you once again for allowing the Federal Law Enforcement
Officers Association to come before you today on this critically
import issue.
Subject to your questions, this concludes my testimony.
Now, the statement of Donald Murphy, Deputy Director, National Park
Service, Washington, DC
STATEMENT OF DONALD W. MURPHY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL PARK
SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BEFORE THE SENATE FINANCE
COMMITTEE, REGARDING U.S. BORDERS: SAFE OR SIEVE
January 30, 2003
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to present the efforts being
made by the National Park Service (NPS) to protect visitors and resources in
national parks.
The NPS practices and policies are dedicated to preserving its natural
resources and providing a safe, clean, and secure environment for its
workforce and visitors. We have initiated programs and studies and
undertaken actions to address many of the concerns and needs in these areas.
The National Parks Omnibus Act of 1998, P.L. 105-391, Section 801 directed
the Secretary to conduct a study to fully evaluate the needs, shortfalls,
and requirements of NPS law enforcements programs. A study team of national
park rangers and U.S. Park Police officers was assembled in February 1999
and the final report, The National Park Service Law Enforcement Programs
Study, was presented to Congress on March 8, 2000, in two volumes. One
addressed the U.S. Park Police and the other addressed the field protection
rangers. Included in the study are suggestions to address shortfalls,
justifications for all suggestions, and a statement of adverse impacts
should identified needs remain unmet. The NPS is implementing a number of
those suggestions as well as a series of law enforcement reforms directed by
the Secretary in July 2002.
[1]
The NPS has Park Police and ranger forces who manage the law enforcement,
resource protection and emergency needs of both people and parks. The
following programs were identified as already in place or were put into effect:
* Drug enforcement funding, initiated in 1992 as a specific line-item in the
NPS budget, has a base of over $9.5 million. Currently all but $2.1 million
is located in the budgets of the parks and the U.S. Park Police. The $2.1
million is allocated annually from a central source to individual parks and
regional offices to address emergency issues. For example, in September 2002
this funding was used in an investigation of marijuana gardens at Sequoia
National Park, which resulted in the removal of over 100,000 plants and led
to 20 indictments.
* The NPS has received funding from several regular and supplemental
appropriations between 1998 and 2001 to cover the costs of anti-terrorism
expenditures. Initial funding in the construction appropriation in FY 1998
provided surveillance and monitoring equipment, perimeter fencing, physical
barriers, and communication equipment at Mount Rushmore National Memorial,
the National Mall, Independence National Historical Park and Jefferson
National Expansion Memorial. Funds were provided in FY 2001 in the Park
Police appropriation for one-time costs associated with the design on a
visitor screening facility and a key system for the Washington Monument, as
well as for the installation of alarm systems and closed-circuit television
at other monuments on the Mall. Total funding provided was $9.9 million.
The NPS manages seven National Parks along the United States-Mexico
international border, including Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument,
Coronado National Memorial, Amistad National Recreation Area, Big Bend
National Park, Chamizal National Memorial, Palo Alto Battlefield National
Historic Site and Padre Island National Seashore. These national park units
share approximately 365 miles of the international border with Mexico and 72
miles of seashore.
They hosted more than 2,780,000 visitors in 2000. Other parks nearby
including Saguaro National Park, Chiricahua National Monument, Fort Bowie
National Historic Site and Tumacacori National Historical Park also feel the
effects of this increase in illegal border activity.
[2]
To the north, Glacier National Park shares approximately forty miles of
international border with Canada. The United States Border Patrol's Spokane
and Havre sectors cover approximately 20 miles each along the international
border with Glacier National Park and Canada's Waterton National Park. The
Border Patrol, along with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, conducts
routine foot and air patrols in their areas of responsibilities along the
international border between these parks. Through the Inter-Agency Border
Enforcement Team (IBET), of which Glacier National Park is a member, we
share information, intelligence, communications, and resources to detect
illegal entries and contraband along the international border.
Although NPS has a variety of law enforcement responsibilities within
national parks, it is not the Federal agency responsible for international
border security. Nevertheless, illegal border activity can threaten park
visitor and employee safety and damage natural and cultural resources within
national parks. Hundreds of miles of illegal roads and trails have been
created and huge amounts of trash and debris litter the landscape, while the
few sources of natural water have been polluted or drained. In 2001, the
Border Patrol estimates that approximately 250,000 undocumented migrants
entered the country through parklands with over 200,000 through Organ Pipe
Cactus National Monument alone. Rangers interdicted over 30,000 pounds of
drugs in 2002, up from 20,000 pounds in 2000. In the summer of 2001, over
20 undocumented migrants died from exposure in or shortly after traveling
through Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument.
One of the most recent incidents concerning employee safety in national
parks located on the United States-Mexico border was the tragic murder of
Ranger Kris Eggle. On the afternoon of August 9, Organ Pipe Cactus National
Monument received a call for assistance. Mexican police
[3]
were chasing a truck that then crossed the border from Mexico into the park.
National park rangers responded to the call along with agents from U.S.
Customs and the Border Patrol. Kris Eggle, a 28-year old ranger, was one of
them. When the truck stalled out, the occupants ran. Ranger Eggle
discovered a fugitive attempting to hide. While approaching the man to
arrest him, Ranger Eggle was shot by an AK-47 automatic rifle. Kris Eggle
died before an ambulance could get him to a hospital.
This incident underscores the need to make changes to better protect park
employees. While the NPS has the responsibility to enforce Federal laws
within the borders of its parks, the NPS's mission is not international
border security. The Department of Homeland Security is the primary Federal
agency responsible for international border security. To better meet the
responsibilities of these respective agencies, the NPS can develop closer
lines of communication and cooperation with the Department of Homeland
Security and other Federal, state, and local agencies. The NPS can create
lasting partnerships so that each agency can accomplish its mission in the
most logical and cost-effective manner. We look forward to working with the
new Department of Homeland Security to establish plans of action and
responsibility for ensuring appropriate border security in parks along the
border.
Increased preparedness was provided through appropriations for operations in
1998, 2000, and 2001. Base increases allowed for additional patrol of
facilities, trained operators of security equipment, dispatch staff, and
training at parks such as Mount Rushmore National Memorial, National Capital
Parks, Independence National Historical Park, Jefferson National Expansion
Memorial, Statue of Liberty National Monument, Boston National Historical
Park and border
[4]
parks such as Coronado National Monument and Organ Pipe Cactus National
Monument. These costs were annually recurring and totaled $4.8 million. A
portion of the increased operational funding (about $700,000) was used to
purchase surveillance equipment, vehicles and bomb-sniffing dogs. This
portion of the operational funding was non-recurred in the NPS budget.
* Through a FY 2002 Supplemental Appropriation, the NPS received funding of
$36.5 million for preparedness in the wake of the September 11, 2001 incident.
* $6.1 million was provided for operational security at icon parks such as
Statue of Liberty National Monument, USS Arizona National Memorial,
Independence National Historical Park and Jefferson National Expansion
Memorial. This funding was requested to be recurring in the FY 2003 budget.
* $25.3 million was provided to the U.S. Park Police for operations and
security improvements in the Washington, D.C. and New York City metropolitan
areas. $12.6 million of this amount was requested to be recurring in the FY
2003 budget.
* $5.1 million was provided for physical facility and perimeter security and
law enforcement equipment at selected icon park sites. This funding
provided non-recurring improvements.
The NPS has proposed the following Law Enforcement Reform Implementation
Strategies to improve law enforcement effectiveness and safety. These
strategies are one part of a broader initiative to improve law enforcement
and security throughout the Department of the Interior.
These strategies include:
* A new senior SES-level leadership position, entitled Associate Director
for Resource and Visitor Protection, has been established to provide
oversight of the Servicewide law enforcement, investigative, and emergency
services functions.
* A Protection Ranger Leadership Board has been established to provide
expert advice and counsel to the NPS Directorate.
* The reporting system for special agents will be restructured to create
a separate line organizational system where field, regional and Washington
special agents report to special agent managers.
* Regional offices will conduct program audits of all park law
enforcement and investigative operations.
* The NPS is committed to implementing an Activity-Based
Costing/Management system for law enforcement programs.
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* Regional offices, working through parks, will conduct assessments of
protection ranger staffing needs. Assessment data will be incorporated into
park specific or region specific base increase requests utilizing the NPS
Operations Formulation Systems with a goal of achieving staffing levels that
meet the critical law enforcement needs.
* The NPS will enhance law enforcement training programs to address
officer safety.
* A Field Training Evaluation Program will be established and implemented
by FY 2004.
* A "bridge training" course will be established that provides a means
for qualified non- NPS federal law enforcement personnel to transition into
the protection ranger series.
* All NPS managers with line authority over NPS law enforcement programs
will be required to attend the national "Law Enforcement for Managers"
course presented by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.
* Special operations training, incident management team training, and
special event team training have proven to be effective tools in responding
to local, regional, and national emergency needs and will continue to be
supported.
* A Security Manager position will be established within the Washington
Division of Law Enforcement and Emergency Services. The potential for
terrorist acts against park resources is an emerging concern that requires a
new approach for assessing risks and vulnerability of park facilities and
resources.
* A new Servicewide incident reporting system to replace the current Case
Incident Reporting System will be implemented immediately.
We have both the statutory and the moral responsibility to ensure that the
388 units in the NPS are well cared for, for this and future generations.
National park rangers have always been seen as a critical element to that
mission. We also have an obligation to work with sister agencies at all
levels to support their missions and legal responsibilities. Park staff
should be able to expect that there is an effective presence to meet our
obligations, that the Service is proactive in identifying and solving
problems, and that if help is needed, it will be available. Like many other
agencies, the NPS will have to use available resources more efficiently to
improve our law enforcement program. Reviewing and managing our priorities
both human resources and
[6]
natural and cultural resources identifying problems and seeking out
creative solutions that involve neighbors and partners will go a long way to
protecting our parks.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any
questions you or other members of the committee may have.
--
Be kind to your neighbors, even | "Global domination, of course!"
though they be transgenic chimerae. | -- The Brain
"People that are really very weird can get into sensitive
positions and have a tremendous impact on history." -- Dan Quayle