CHAPTER 2

THE FUTURE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 

    Rather than a single, focused threat, America's twenty-first
    century Army faces a broad range of challenges.

	  	-- General Gordon R. Sullivan

       	           Chief of Staff, United States Army

2-1. Trends - Elements of Instability.

a. The world's geopolitical framework will continue to undergo dramatic restructuring, accompanied by a wide array of economic, technical, societal, religious, cultural, and physical alterations. History shows that change of this scope, scale, and pace increases global tension and disorder.

(1) Balance of Power. Although nation states will continue to be the world's primary political unit, they are under attack in much of the world. Shifting and unstable power balances at the national and subnational levels in the Balkans, Middle East, and throughout Africa and Asia threaten to engage the vital interests of the major powers and tempt intervention.

(2) Nationalism. Nationalism has replaced communist ideology as the leading cause of interstate and intrastate conflict. Based on many sources of mass identity­religious, tribal, ethnic, historical, or territorial­nationalist movements are supplanting older, ideologically based identities. These movements can erode the power and legitimacy of states; in some cases, these movements are closely linked to criminal organizations. Under the guise of transnationalism, these movements may also serve as an excuse for regional strife, as one nation seeks to extend its authority over all members of its ethnic group.

(3) Rejection of the West. Much of the non-Western world is rejecting Western political and cultural values. Regimes that kept foreign political forms are under attack by ethnic, religious, and nationalistic groups seeking to establish or reestablish their identity. As tribal, nationalist, or religious movements replace secular regimes, instability ensues. This instability threatens not only Western interests within the state but often threatens to spill across borders.

(4) Competition. The relevance of the conventional balance-of-power theory is questionable. In its place are rivalries between states and nonstate groups for power: political, military, information­and particularly, economic. Advances in production and marketing techniques have widened the gap between rich and poor states. Control of resources has not allowed all less-developed states to modernize and become economically competitive. Questions of access to, or control of, strategic resources, lines of communications, and markets are likely to lead to conflict. The temptation to use military force to redress perceived economic imbalances will be great.

(5) Demographics. Population growth, particularly in the less-developed world, will strain the resources and social structures of the states affected. Because much of the world's population growth occurs in areas prone to natural disasters and famine, such events can cause mass migrations of refugees.

(6) Ungovernability. The ability of a government to govern effectively is being eroded in much of the world. The global economy renders economic policies and controls ineffective; throughout the world, governments are less able to provide economic stability and security for their populace. Capitalism and the collapse of dictated economies are creating problems of distribution and structural unemployment. Immature government infrastructures in developing democracies cause expectations to be unmet and groups to turn to other outlets for hope, often leading to conflict. With this eroding security comes a rise in ungoverned groups­criminal organizations. When combined with nationalist groups, criminal groups have the potential to supplement, or even supplant, the state.

(7) Technological Acceleration. Rapid improvements in technology are disrupt- ing established ways of doing business. Information technology is allowing businesses to reduce middle management and support staffs. Aside from the vast increase in unemployment worldwide, technology improvements enable companies and states to leapfrog some technologies. American technical superiority cannot be guaranteed. As in the past, a revolutionary advance in technology could result in reordering of economic or military power.

(8) Environmental Risks. Conditions that pose serious environmental risks may add to future instability. Natural disasters and changes in climate or environment can ruin a region's economy and send the populace across borders as refugees. Man-made crises may also cause tension. Cross-border pollution will cause tension, both within regions and between developed and less-developed nations. Additionally, questions of securing or safely controlling atomic or chemical facilities may provoke military operations designed to secure both weapons and plants on environmental as well as political grounds.

(9) Information Technology. Rapid advances will continue to be made in the way we collect, communicate, and use information. Microprocessing technology will result in a proliferation of communications and information devices, causing an unparalleled rise in cultural and political consciousness. The power of shared information and the ability to manipulate communications media will challenge the authority of long-standing institutions and the meaning of terms such as sovereignty. Information proliferation, however, may prove to be a double-edged sword. Manipulation of the media to control public opinion or awareness can be practiced by both governments and nonstate actors. Access to information involving other cultures, without a discriminating mechanism to explain them, may prove to be a significant source of friction.

b. We are in a period of great transition. The changes experienced in the few years following the end of the Cold War will likely continue. In their wake will follow crises, conflict, and war. In the early twenty-first century, the United States will face challenges of unprecedented complexity, diversity, and scope. Overt attacks on the U.S. and its strategic interests may be rare, but lower-scale operations will likely spread widely over distances and time. Few states will have the resources, or the need, to directly attack the U.S. in the near future. However, many will challenge it for control or dominance of a particular region.

2-2. Characteristics of Future Armies.

The Cold War paradigm of threat analysis is insufficient to capture the full spectrum of military capabilities that future threats may display. Consequently, the threat spectrum model (TSM) shown in Figure 2-1 arrays potential threats across a spectrum from simple to complex in scope, doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, and soldiers.

Figure 2-1

Threat Spectrum Model

a. Phenomenological Threats. Nonmilitary threats resulting from human occurrences and experiences may require a military response. These phenomena can include environmental disasters, health epidemics, famine, major population dislocations, and illegal immigration.

b. Nonnation Forces. Nonnation security threats, using modern technologies that give them niche capabilities similar to those of nation states, have become increasingly visible, challenging the traditional nation state environment. Scope differentiates the categories of nonnation threats.

(1) Subnational. Subnational threats include the political, racial, religious, cultural, and ethnic conflicts that challenge the defining features and authority of the nation state from within.

(2) Anational. Anational threats operate without regard to the authority of their nation states. Not part of the nation state, these entities have no desire to establish such a status. Regional organized crime, piracy, and terrorist activities comprise these threats.

(3) Metanational. Metanational threats move beyond the nation state, operating on an interregional or global scale. They include religious movements, international criminal organizations, and informal economic organizations that facilitate weapons proliferation. See Figure 2-2.

c. Internal Security Forces. In most cases, these are the small, poorly trained and equipped forces of the less-developed world, that can maintain order within a country but would be hard-pressed to defend its borders or conduct extended military operations. As with nonnation forces, most internal security forces and local criminal activity may be strongly connected.

Figure 2-2

The New Warrior Class

d. Infantry-Based Armies. Comprising the majority of the less-developed world's armies, these armies have some armor but are reliant upon dismounted infantry for the bulk of their combat power. Their skills in integrating weapons technology into operations and their abilities to conduct combined arms operations are marginal-to-basic (tactical level). In many respects they resemble the armies of World War I, with more lethal weaponry.

e. Armor-Mechanized-Based Armies. Armies of most industrial nations fall into this class­those that generally mount at least 40 percent of their forces in armored vehicles. Effectiveness of weapons integration and ability to combine arms vary. These armies share several characteristics. First, they tend to modernize selected systems to match the best systems deployed by their neighbors. Second, they display generally hierarchical C3I structures. Not as technologically advanced as complex, adaptive armies, particularly in the harnessing of information technology, they compensate with numbers and weight of metal.

f. Complex, Adaptive Armies. From developed nations, these most technically and tactically advanced armies will be smaller and exceedingly expensive to equip, train, and maintain. Complex forces possess greater flexibility to seize opportunities on the battlefield as well as to adapt to dynamic situations across the continuum of War and OOTW. Future military operations conducted by these armies will involve increasingly high-technology equipment, joint/multinational forces, multidimensional maneuver, precision munitions, smart weapons platforms, and enhanced situational awareness. These operations will also be conducted under the threat of theater ballistic missile attack and other weapons of mass destruction. However, the multiplication of specialized units that allows flexibility also adds vulnerabilities. Disruption of key support elements can render a combat force ineffective or, at least, eliminate its edge over a less-advanced force.

g. Comparisons. Future conflicts may involve simultaneous operations against foes of varying capabilities. As shown in Figure 2-3, preindustrial nations and most nonnation groups cannot, or will not, invest in the weapons and technology necessary to keep pace with the best militaries in their regions. These forces range in size from irregular forces and constabularies to large, infantry-based armies. When opposed by an adversary of similar capabilities, such forces may conduct conventional, force-oriented combat. However, when faced with a large, technologically advanced army, they are likely to attempt to redefine the terms of conflict and pursue their aims through terrorism, insurgency, or partisan warfare. Such unconventional strategies focus on the population while attempting to retain freedom of action by avoiding combat with superior forces. They entail a protracted struggle in which the unconventional force seeks to exploit favorable circumstances to inflict casualties and achieve tactical successes against high-technology opponents while continuing to contest control of the population. In the case of intervention by an external power or coalition, this strategy aims to undermine the enemy's will to continue a seemingly intractable, costly conflict without the necessity of defeating his main forces on the battlefield.

h. Proliferation and Modernization. The most serious challenge to U.S. military superiority will not come from any one state or group but from a process­the proliferation of weapons and technology. Proliferation will allow potential adversaries and developing nations to improve at least parts of their armed forces relatively quickly. Threat forces will probably assess their own deficiencies using the lessons learned from the Gulf War and Somalia. Weapons modernization follows two tracks: nations that can afford to, buy state- of-the-art systems (for their region); states that cannot, upgrade current systems. Accordingly, more use will be made of strap-on technologies to upgrade existing systems. Nevertheless, because of budget restraints, military technology will likely advance at a slower rate than commercial. Three areas of technology require emphasis: weapons of mass destruction (WMD), information operations, and space control. See Figure 2-4.

Figure 2-3

Range of Future Operations

Figure 2-4

Key Technologies with Military Impact

(1) Weapons of Mass Destruction. The security challenge having the most serious ramifications for U.S. interests will come from the proliferation of WMD. The strategic-political effects of WMD overshadow their military utility. WMD and theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) allow an adversary to extend its operational and strategic reach. Although few potential adversaries appear willing to purchase (when available), develop, or deploy the delivery systems needed to threaten the continental U.S., such possibilities cannot be overlooked. In the future, we will face a different world threat­not of overwhelming, global nuclear war­but of states or even criminal groups with inventories of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and fewer inhibitions about using them.

(2) Information Operations. The increasing proliferation of information technol- ogy provides potential adversaries­whether nations, organizations, or individuals­with the capability to conduct increasingly sophisticated information operations against the U.S. Potential adversaries do not need high-technology or strictly military systems to conduct effective information warfare. The ability to manipulate, isolate, or negate portions of the electromagnetic spectrum will be a key element of future military operations. Disruption of an opponent's ability to use these systems while protecting our own will prove crucial in the future. Information operations will not be limited to times of open hostilities.

(3) Space Control. Space-based assets will provide an ever-increasing propor- tion of the intelligence, communications, and navigational support to the world's militaries and economies. Commercial, space-based systems already provide communications, imagery, and global location services to any paying customer. States that can afford to de- velop or purchase launch technology can develop antisatellite systems to negate low-flying reconnaissance satellites. States that do not have space programs can erode the relative advantage of those that do by purchasing space-produced products and services.

i. Capabilities Integration. Access to technology does not equal force modernization. Although a nation can leapfrog technologies­for example, space, nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles­improving integrative capability is more difficult. Those states that do show drastic improvements often do so through the importation of foreign military and technical advisors. Of the two, the foreign military advisor is the more important in improving a state's integrative capability. See Figure 2-5.

2-3. Future Battle.

a. Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Improvements in weapons technology with improvements in integrative capability increase weapons' lethality, range, and other physical factors. Innovations in technology and doctrine are the harbingers of change in warfare. Dramatic developments in both of these areas have resulted in a revolution in military affairs, sometimes referred to as a military technical revolution, which will continue into the twenty-first century. Operations Just Cause, Desert Storm, and Restore Hope epitomize this revolution and offer us a glimpse of the future. Notwithstanding these momentous changes, one aspect of human conflict remains unchanged: the paramount importance of land power as an essential element of any security strategy and the consequent requirement to impose control over people, territory, and events. Land power equates to strategic staying power.

Figure 2-5

Military Technical Revolution (MTR)

b. Future Battlefields. Future conflicts can run the gamut from general war to OOTW. Battle between mechanized forces will be similar to armored operations of the past three decades. However, combat involving advanced, complex, adaptive armies will take the trends of Desert Storm forward to transform the battlefield. Dominant aspects of the future conventional battlefield are battle command, extended battlespace, simultaneity, spectrum supremacy, and the rules of war.

(1) Battle Command. Command will remain a combination of art and science. Yet the art will be more necessary now than before because commanders must apply principles and design considerations and frameworks in situations and scenarios we cannot predict with any certainty­truly a different demand on commanders than the relatively prescriptive and known scenarios of the Cold War. Advances in information management and distribution will facilitate the horizontal integration of battlefield functions and aid commanders in tailoring forces and arranging them on land. New communications systems allow nonhiearchical dissemination of intelligence, targeting, and other data at all levels. This new way of managing forces will alter, if not replace, traditional, hierarchical command structures with new, internetted designs (see Figure 2-6). Accordingly, units, key nodes, and leaders will be more widely dispersed, leading to the continuation of the empty battlefield phenomenon. Because this internetted structure can diffuse command authority, new leadership and command approaches will be required of many militaries. Thus, in most modern armies, the diversity of operating environments, equipment sophistication, increased tempo, and substitution of situational knowledge for traditional physical control will place unprecedented demands on soldiers and leaders. To win on future battlefields, future leaders of all armies must be skilled in the art of military operations, capable of adjusting rapidly to the temporal and spatial variations of new battlefields.

Figure 2-6

Command Information Structures

(2) Extended Battlespace. Looking at conventional and high-intensity warfare, recent military-technical developments point toward an increase in the depth, breadth, and height of the battlefield. This extension of the battlespace with fewer soldiers in it is an evolutionary trend in the conduct of war. The continuing ability to target the enemy, combined with rapid information processing and distribution, smart systems, and smart munitions, will accelerate this phenomenon. As armies seek to survive, formations will be more dispersed, contributing to the empty battlefield. Commanders will seek to avoid linear actions, close-in combat, stable fronts, and long operational pauses. Recent U.S. operations show that deep battle has advanced beyond the concept of attacking the enemy's follow-on forces in a sequenced approach to shape the close battle to one of simultaneous attack to stun, then rapidly defeat the enemy. Commanders may place greater emphasis on operational- and/or tactical-level raids­combined with deep strike means­to break up an enemy's formations from within. The relationship between fire and maneuver may undergo a trans- formation as armies with high technology place increasing emphasis on simultaneous strikes throughout the battlespace, maneuver forces may be physically massed for shorter periods of time.

(3) Simultaneity. The RMA may transform the familiar form and structure of military campaigns as a chain of sequentially phased operations. Advanced forces will possess the capability to achieve multiple operational objectives nearly simultaneously throughout a theater of operations. This simultaneity, coupled with the pervasive influence of near-real-time military and public communications, will blur and compress the traditional divisions between strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. We have seen simultaneity first attempted in Grenada, followed by use in Just Cause in Panama and Desert Storm against Iraq. During Desert Storm, no enemy force in the Kuwait theater was safe from simultaneous attack. No enemy force began to move, however, until coalition ground forces attacked. Yet the coalition massed those land forces for only a short period to gain the strategic staying-power effect.

(4) Spectrum Supremacy. Information technological advances will ensure that future operations will unfold before a global audience. Access to media will allow global or official audiences to become involved in, or react to, any and all events. Consequently, military operations, regardless of their importance, dimension, or location, will be conducted on a global stage. Tactical actions and the hardships of soldiers and civilians alike will have an increasing impact on strategic decision making and dramatically alter the concept of time­time from crisis to expected action and time for actual conduct of operations. As in the past, real-time visual images of operations, both positive or negative, will influence national will and popular support for them.

(5) Rules of War. Relative to recent history, warfare is becoming less civilized: using U.N. soldiers or foreigners as hostages, threatening to use chemical weapons, targeting heads of state, and violating territorial integrity. Recent conflicts support this trend. Actions once regarded as criminal are accepted if performed by a state or an organized nonnation force. Particularly in OOTW environments, collection of intelligence, predictions of opposing force behavior, and ability of our soldiers to assess enemy behavior and act quickly will prove to be difficult challenges.

2-4. Future Threats.

a. Assessing Conflicts. Most of the conflicts involving the U.S. Army will be OOTW or low-intensity conflicts, as few states will risk open war with the U.S. However, the specter of open war against foes fielding advanced, armor-mech-based armies must be considered. At this point, we can identify regions­not specific countries­where the conditions to facilitate or cause high-intensity conflict or overt military challenges to U.S. interests exist.

b. Assessing Military Capabilities. Relative improvement in potential threat force capabilities has two bounding principles. First, how much technology and weaponry a state can afford and integrate limits improvement. Second, knowing that states generally will arm to meet perceived regional threats, analysts can focus their analysis. The region that will require the most attention is Asia as its armies modernize from defensive or internal security models into ones capable of projecting power.

c. Assessing Nonnation Threats. A major challenge to intelligence analysis will lie in developing a reliable, verifiable methodology for measuring nonnation forces' military capabilities. This is compounded by the profusion, and mingling, of criminal as well as ethnic or subnationalist and supranationalist elements within almost every nonnation force.

2-5. Summary.

In summary, the character of future military operations can no longer be anticipated merely by analyzing an adversary's stage of economic development; regional or even local powers may possess the capability of employing extremely advanced military technologies. An adversary's actions will require intelligence analysis of fields extending far beyond the traditional battlefield focus. Boundaries within the spectrum of operations will become even more blurred than they are now. Current political and technical trends suggest that, as a matter of course, successful conflict prosecution and termination will depend upon multinational commitment, joint operations, and a high professional tolerance for the new forms of conflict. The days of the all-purpose doctrinal threat template are gone, just as the days of a single-prescription Army doctrine are gone.

Go on to the next chapter Return to the Table of Contents